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Introduction 
A striking feature of the official documentation of the National Assets 
Management Agency (NAMA) and subsequent commentary is its lack of 
attention to geographic or spatial considerations. Indeed, this tendency of 
‘aspatial’ analysis has also been a key feature of banking and financial 
operations, where property assets, which exist in physical space and have 
a specific geographic location, are presented in numerical form (often 
aggregated) on loan books, on balance sheets and indeed as part of 
complex asset bundles, such as CDOs (collatoralised debt obligations). 
Such an understanding and presentation of data serves very much to 
conceal the geography of those assets.  
 
During the boom, financial institutions massively expanded their total 
lending and, as we know, what characterises the Irish banking system 
(and crisis), is that much of the lending went into property, which has a 
very particular geography. And, given the general tendency of property 
developers and investors to engage in developments in increasingly 
riskier locations the longer the boom goes on, and the considerable 
property price inflation that occured in every region in Ireland, it was the 
overlooking of geographical considerations that facilitated further 
inflation of the asset bubble. 
 
That push to boost lending and increase the profitability of banks seemed 
to pay little attention to broader indicators in the Irish economy but also 
failed to pay due cognisance to locational considerations. In an industry 
in which the three rubric for success have long been recognied as 
“location, location and location”, such overlooking of spatial 
considerations is nothing short of amazing. 
 
The very viability of NAMA as a financial project is highly dependent on 
the geography of those property assets which underpin the loans which 
NAMA is purchasing. While certain well-located assets may indeed 
provide for a secure yield in the medium term, others, such as large sites 
lacking any urban zoning status located at the edge of small Irish towns 
and villages for which enormous prices were paid per hectare, are 
unlikely even in the very long term to prove to possess much value above 
that of farmland. 
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Approaching the ‘details’ of NAMA and applying sectoral and 
geographical scenarios 
From the draft NAMA business plan released in October 2009, one can 
ascertain the broad composition of the loans. Of the total amount of 
€77bn of loans being transferred to NAMA from banks’ asset sheets: 
 €27.8bn (36%) relates to ‘land’  
 €21.8bn (28%) relates to ‘development loans’ 
 €27.7bn (36%) relates to ‘associated loans’ 
Beyond that broad breakdown, there is little information on when the 
loans were granted, on the type of property to which the loans relate 
(residential, office, retail, industrial, etc.) and on the geography of the 
assets.  
 
To date, the total extent of our knowledge of the ‘geography’ of those 
loans is provided only by a very broad break-down between international 
locations (see Figure 1). But in a sector in which a matter of 40 or 50 
metres distance between sites might mean the difference between success 
and failure in the case of urban redevelopment projects, particularly in 
office development markets, such crude delimitation is almost entirely 
unhelpful. Unfortunately, we know too little about the location of 
NAMA-related property for an accurate assessment to be made as to 
their likely real value.  
 
Figure 1. The Geographical Breakdown of NAMA’s Portfolio 
 
 
 
Source: Draft NAMA Business Plan (2009) 
 
Some €33.13bn of those loans relate to properties located in the Republic 
of Ireland. However, an appraisal of the real value of the underlying 
assets requires, in the case of loans against land, a review of the 
geographical location, zoning characteristics and planning status. For development 
loans, an evaluation needs to be undertaken of the sectoral status 
(residential, industrial, office, retail and other commercial) of schemes 
within a local context in which the current level of provision of such 
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property is taken into account, together with considerations of existing 
vacancy rates, the projected scale and stage of development (completions, 
currently on-site or due to be undertaken), and the prevailing and 
projected scales of demand for such space. 
 
As laid out in the draft NAMA business plan (NAMA, 2009), NAMA will 
pay €54bn for loans with a book value of €77bn, representing a 30 
percent “haircut” on the original loans’ value. While NAMA will pay 15 
percent above the estimated current market value for the assets, it does 
so on the basis that the total reduction in average property prices in the 
boom-slump cycle is 47 percent (the peak having occured in early 2007 
and the trough estimated to have occured in September 2009) and that 
the 15 percent premium can be recouped over the lifetime of NAMA 
through a rising property market.  
 
While we do not have specific information on the geographical location 
of the assets that are to be transferred to NAMA, we can examine some 
recent trends in the property market and compare them to the 
assumptions underpinning NAMA. 
 
The Agricultural Land-Price Spiral 
What became clear during the boom years was that a very sharp increase 
in land prices was occuring, not just in and near urban areas but also in 
rural areas – agricultural land. According to Savills-HOK’s Irish 
Agricultural Land Research report in May 2007, Irish land values jumped 
from just under €10,000 per hectare (€3,850 per acre) in 1998 to over 
€58,400 per hectare (€23,600 per acre) in 2006, by far the highest price 
per hectare in Europe (see Figures 2 and 3). This jump in part reflected 
the tendency for farmers to sell small plots of land for development 
purposes (one-off housing) and an increasing trend of wealthy individuals 
buying small farms for lifestyle purposes, particularly within commuting 
distance of Dublin. In many cases, the proceeds from land sales was re-
invested in farmland, where farmers with land at the edge of towns sold 
them off during the boom times and bought farms elsewhere pushing up 
land prices even further and becoming even more out-of-kilter with the 
day-to-day economics of farming. With the onset of the property crash, 
agricultural land prices have and will continue to fall back sharply, with 
those greenfield sites at the edge of towns bought with redevelopment in 
mind, open to devaluations in the region of 90-95 percent. 
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Figure 2. Irish Land Values 1973-2006 (€ per hectare) 
 
 
 
Source: Savills HOK (2007) CSO, Eurostat, Farmers Journal 
 
Figure 3. European Land Values by Country 2005/6 (€ per hectare) 
 
 
 
Source: Savills HOK (2007) CSO, Eurostat, Farmers Journal 
30
Record Site Prices 
If we examine some of the record prices paid for redevelopment sites in 
urban areas at the height of the boom, and compare them to revaluations 
on other similar sites during the slump, it should give us some indication 
as to the real extent of price falls.  
 
In late 2005, a number of significant site sales in the prestigious area of 
Ballsbridge in Dublin 4 attracted considerable attention. During this 
period, the developer Sean Dunne bought two sites, the former Jury’s 
Hotel and the former Berkeley Court Hotel. The sites comprised seven 
acres and were purchased for ca. €379M, averaging a then unprecedented 
€54.1M per acre (MacDonald and Sheridan, 2008; Brawn, 2009). Another 
developer, Ray Grehan of Glenkerrin Homes bought a nearby 2.05 acre 
site, the former UCD Veterinary College, for ca. €171.5M, an incredible 
€83.7M per acre. In 2006, a small site of just over a third of an acre went 
for almost €40M (€95M per acre). These were purchases that were made 
close to the height of the boom for potential redevelopment sites which 
had no planning permission. Even if the subsequently proposed mixed-
use developments had been given planning permission and had they been 
completed at the height of the property boom, the margins for 
profitability were already stretched. So what scale of price devaluations 
could we expect in the property crash for these sites? 
 
Take the example of a nearby 0.5 acre site on Herbert Road, Ballsbridge; 
this former Cablelink office-building was offered for sale in autumn 
2007, just after the peak of the property boom, for €30M. Two years 
later, the asking price stood at €9.5M representing a 68 percent decrease, 
and that was the asking price – by no means an accurate indicator of how 
low market prices could fall.  
 
As has been well-documented on the Ireland After Nama blog (see 
Kitchin, 2009; Moore, 2009), the case of the Irish Glass Bottle site in 
Ringsend in Dublin 4 is instructive. This 24.9 acre site, purchased in early 
2007 for ca. €413M (€16.6M per acre) by a consortium involving 
companies of Bernard McNamara and Derek Quinlan and the Dublin 
Docklands Development Authority (DDDA), was revalued in October 
2009 at €60M. This represents a whopping 85 percent price devaluation, 
which is significantly above the “haircut” of 30 percent or the 47 percent 
average property price fall upon which NAMA’s calculations are based. 
In the case of the Irish Glass Bottle site, we are talking about a large 
centrally-located brownfield site with special planning status for mixed 
use (residential and enterprise) functions under the DDDA’s Master Plan, 
with reasonably good prospects of redevelopment in the medium-to-
longer term. Yet, in spite of the existence of an overarching planning 
framework, this site has retained only 15 percent of its market-peak 
value. This begs the question that if such well-located sites are 
experiencing such colossal price falls, then what are the prospects for 
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greenfield sites at the edge of cities or at the edge of towns throughout 
Ireland. 
 
Investigating Development Loans – The changing geography of 
Dublin’s office stock 
Many of the Development Loans and Associated Loans set out in the NAMA 
business plan (NAMA, 2009) relate to loans for commercial property in 
Ireland. It is to an examination of recent trends and indicators for the 
different commercial property sectors that this discussion now turns. 
Taking the Dublin office market as an example, research from the Centre 
for Urban and Regional Studies (CURS), TCD and Savills-HOK 
(MacLaran & O’Connell, 2007) has traced the changing volume and 
geography of office space in Dublin since 1995. Over the past 15 years, 
the volume of modern office stock expanded enormously. However, the 
geography of office development has also changed significantly, where 
proportionately, there has been a fall in the dominance of the prime 
office locations of Dublin 2 and 4, while suburban office locations have 
grown substantially (see Table 1). While in 1995, suburban office 
developments accounted for 14.6 percent of the total stock, by 2008, that 
figure had leapt to over 35 percent. 
 
Table 1. The Changing Geography of the Modern Office Stock in 
Dublin, 1995-2008 
 
 1995 2008 
Dublin 2 54.5 % 32.0 % 
Dublin 4 14.1 % 12.4 % 
Dublin 1, 7, 8 16.8 % 14.9 % 
IFSC / North Docks n.a. 5.6 % 
Blackrock / Dun Laoghaire 4.4 % 3.3 % 
North Suburbs 0.7 % 6.4 % 
West Suburbs 1.9 % 10.1 % 
Other South Suburbs 7.6 % 15.4 % 
 
Source: CURS/SavillsHOK Office Database 
 
Rates of vacancy in the modern office stock vary considerably 
geographically and are particularly high in certain suburbs, having been 
especially high in west Dublin (see Figure 4). The research indicates that 
since 2007, there have been high levels of activity in office construction 
in suburban areas, office space that has yet to reach the market. It is 
likely that some loans associated with office space in suburban areas will 
be transferred to NAMA, areas that even during the boom were 
experiencing relatively high vacancy levels.  
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Figure 4. Vacancy Rates in Dublin’s office stock, December 2000 to 
December 2008 
 
 
 
Source: CURS/SavillsHOK Office Database 
 
Moreover, with the then Minister for Justice Dermot Ahern proposing in 
later 2009 to ban the use of upward-only rent reviews for all new leases 
in commercial property, this would likely have a downward effect on the 
capital values that new office buildings would achieve. While, this 
proposed ban could be seen as a positive step for some business sectors 
(new tenants especially), it may have serious implications for NAMA (and 
simultaneously for Irish society) as NAMA’s business model is tied to a 
rising property market. More specifically, many of NAMA’s underpinning 
calculations drew heavily on trends and expectations in commercial 
property sectors, which at that time were based on a system of upward-
only rent reviews. 
 
Residential Loans 
It is likely that a good deal of the Development and Associated Loans 
relate to residential developments at various stages of construction. And, 
while it is clear that substantial reductions have occured in house prices 
generally, it is difficult to gauge the likely level of devaluation on 
residential loans that will transfer to NAMA. Where loans transferred to 
NAMA are found to involve housing developments that are at a stage of 
completion, we can draw on new house prices as an indicator.   
 
33
Figure 5. New house prices – National, Dublin and Regional, 2000-
2009Q2 
 
 
 
Source: DoEHLG, Housing Statistics Bulletins, various years 
 
Based on the DoEHLG’s Housing Statistics Bulletins, Figure 5 indicates 
that new house prices nationally fell by 26 percent from the peak of the 
boom (2007Q2) to July 2009. For Cork and Galway, the figure was 23 
percent, for Limerick, 11 percent, with Waterford and other areas 
experiencing 26 percent and 25 percent price drops respectively. Notably, 
the fall was sharpest in Dublin where new house prices fell by 40 percent 
and there is little to indicate that the downward trend halted in 
September 2009, the date that the draft NAMA business plan (NAMA, 
2009) has taken to represent the price-floor of the market. 
Unsurprisingly, sales activity was much reduced.  
 
Notably, the type of ‘assets’ that will be transferred to NAMA will likely 
include some of those unfinished housing estates and apartment 
complexes that have become a very visible feature of the Irish landscape 
– in city suburbs, in inner-city neighbourhoods and at the edge of towns 
and villages countrywide. In these cases, the ratio of market value to loan 
value will have fallen dramatically, with the management and disposal of 
these ‘assets’ likely to prove difficult and expensive.   
 
The property crash beyond NAMA 
While this discussion has sought to develop further a geography of 
NAMA’s portfolio, raising some serious questions about the calculations 
and underpinning assumptions of NAMA in the process, it must also be 
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remembered that there are other major elements of the property crash 
that will not be addressed by NAMA. The NAMA portfolio involves 
loans relating to ca.1,600 borrowers, with just 100 borrowers accounting 
for 50 percent of the portfolio. Land, Development and Associated 
Loans of less than €5M are excluded from NAMA (except those with 
EBS and Irish Nationwide). The number of these loans is unknown but 
their geography is likely to be predominantly rural in nature or rather, at 
the fringe of towns and villages throughout Ireland. Then, of course, 
there is that far more immediate concern for tens-of-thousands of 
households of mortgage repayment difficulties, negative equity and the 
threat of housing foreclosures in the not-too-distant future. In NAMA 
and the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), these households will find little 
comfort.  
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